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Does Voluntary Corporate Social Performance Attract Institutional Investment? 
Evidence from China 
Mingzhu Wang* 
Yugang Chen 
 
ABSTRACT 
Manuscript Type:  Empirical 
 
Research Question/Issue: This study analyses whether institutional investment in China is 
affected by the voluntary corporate social performance (CSP) of firms, after controlling for 
ownership structure, corporate governance, compensation and other firm characteristics.  
 
Research Findings/Insights: Firms with superior voluntary CSP attract more institutional 
investment, which remains robust after controlling for the reverse causality problem. Mutual 
funds are the main driver of the institutional investment pattern in China and invest more in 
firms that achieve better voluntary CSP with respect to employment equality and customer 
care. Insurance companies and social security funds invest more in firms that take care of 
their customers. Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFIIs) are the only type of 
institutional investors tilting their investment in favour of firms doing well at saving energy.  
 
Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our empirical evidence suggests different types of 
institutional investors showing preferences towards different aspects of investee firms‟ 
voluntary CSP. We innovatively separate firms‟ voluntary CSP into expected components 
that can be explained by firm characteristics and unexpected components (surprises) that 
cannot be explained by firm characteristics. Although institutional investors, in general, and 
mutual funds and QFIIs, in particular, own more shares in firms with more voluntary CSP 
surprises, only mutual funds trade on them in the subsequent year.  
 
Practitioner/Policy Implications: Foreign institutional investors invest more in firms with 
better voluntary CSP, especially with respect to energy-saving and environmental issues, but 
they do not show a significant preference towards firms with better corporate governance in 
China. Our paper offers implications for policy makers in transitory and emerging economies 
with regards encouraging foreign institutional investors‟ equity investment.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Transitory and emerging economics (TEEs) have experienced a surge of awareness 
for and attention paid to corporate social responsibility (CSR) issues in the past decade. For 
example, China supplied more delegates than any other country to the 2007 International 
Leaders‟ Summit of the UN Global Compact (Waddock, 2008). As of 2009, Chinese firms 
were issuing over 15% of the world‟s CSR reports, but there is significant variation across 
Chinese firms in the amount of information disclosed on specific CSR activities (China WTO 
Tribune, 2009). Simultaneously, institutional investment, especially from foreign investors, 
has increased in TEEs. Prior studies (Coffey and Fryxell, 1991; Graves and Waddock, 1994; 
Cox, Brammer and Williamton, 2004) report the influence of voluntary corporate social 
performance (CSP) on institutional investment in developed economies. Despite the 
increasing importance and awareness of CSR in TEEs, the extant literature offers limited 
evidence from TEEs on the association between firms‟ CSP and institutional investors. Li and 
Lu (2016) empirically examine whether Chinese firms‟ environmental capital expenditure, an 
important dimension of CSR, affects the investment decisions of institutional investors, by 
classifying them into long-term and short-term investors. Differently from Li and Lu (2016), 
we consider firms‟ overall voluntary CSP and its multiple dimensions. In addition to the 
different methodologies adopted, we categorize institutional investors by their business 
nature into mutual funds, insurance companies, social security funds, and Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investors (QFIIs).   
We aim to answer the following questions, yet to be clarified in the literature. Do 
firms with superior voluntary CSP attract more investment from institutional investors in 
TEEs? Do foreign institutional investors, mostly from developed countries, demonstrate a 
preference for firms‟ voluntary CSP and corporate governance in TEEs, similarly to their 
investment pattern in developed economies? We address these questions by analysing the link 
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between the voluntary CSP of 1,461 Chinese listed firms and the shareholdings of different 
types of institutional investors, collectively and separately. 
China provides a unique context for investigating the aforementioned research 
questions because endogeneity is of less concern, a unique rating for firms‟ voluntary CSP is 
available, and institutional investment has experienced explosive development. First, 
endogeneity is of relatively lower concern in our study. Institutional investors in China, as 
minority shareholders, are passive investors (Yuan et al., 2009) and provide little monitoring 
of company management (Chen et al., 2006). As such, China provides a better research 
context for analysing whether firms‟ voluntary CSP affects institutional investment than 
developed economies where institutional investors are more active in monitoring their 
investee firms. Second, firms‟ CSR activities had been voluntary in China until December 31, 
2008. A firm‟s voluntary CSP may be more informative than mandatory CSP in explaining 
institutional investors‟ decision making. The Society of National Accounting Institute (SNAI) 
provides a unique CSR rating based solely on the voluntary CSR activities of all Chinese 
listed firms in 2007.
i
 Its full coverage makes analyses of a large sample possible, and in turn 
provides more conclusive empirical evidence. Third, institutional investment has more than 
quintupled, from 5.73% in 2003 to 37.17% in 2010 (Xi, 2006), fuelled by equity investments 
from domestic institutional investors
 
and QFIIs.
ii
 Despite the dramatic increase in 
institutional investment, its landscape in the Chinese stock market remains ambiguous in the 
literature. Our study hence meets the timely call for studies of institutional investment in 
China and offers insights that could help foreign institutional investors with their investment 
decisions in TEEs like China. 
We find that Chinese firms with superior voluntary CSP attract more institutional 
investment. This positive association remains robust after controlling for the reverse causality 
problem, ownership structure, corporate governance, compensation and other firm 
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characteristics. Mutual funds are the main driver of this investment pattern of institutional 
investors in China. Different types of institutional investors show preferences towards 
different dimensions of voluntary CSP.  
Our study offers three contributions to the literature. The first contribution is to 
provide robust empirical evidence that a firm‟s voluntary CSP does attract more institutional 
investment in a TEE. Apart from choosing the Chinese research context, we adopt the lead-
lag model to further alleviate the endogeneity problem and find that institutional investments 
in current and subsequent years are positively associated with firms‟ voluntary CSP. Such 
positive associations remain robust after controlling for the reverse causality problem using 
the two-stage least squares (2SLS) method.  
Furthermore, we identify the types of institutional investors in China attracted by the 
voluntary CSP of Chinese listed firms. Both mutual funds and QFIIs invest more in firms 
with better voluntary CSP. We do not observe such an investment preference amongst long-
term institutional investors such as insurance companies and social security funds, which is 
different from the UK evidence reported in Cox et al. (2004). However, mutual funds, QFIIs 
and long-term institutional investors are all likely to increase their shareholdings in firms 
with superior voluntary CSP in the subsequent year. Our further tests suggest that mutual 
funds invest more in firms achieving better voluntary CSP with respect to equality and 
customers, but less in those doing well at saving energy. QFIIs are the only type of 
institutional investors investing more in firms achieving better CSP in terms of saving energy. 
Insurance companies and social security funds prefer firms that look after their customers.  
Last but not least, we provide empirical evidence on the impact of „surprises‟ in firms‟ 
voluntary CSP, on institutional investment, by innovatively splitting a firm‟s voluntary CSP 
into two components – expected and unexpected. The unexpected voluntary CSP contains 
information surprises to institutional investors, whereas expected CSP can be explained by 
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other firm characteristics. Institutional investors in general, and mutual funds and QFIIs in 
particular, hold a high percentage of shareholdings in firms with surprisingly superior 
voluntary CSP that cannot be explained by corporate governance, ownership structure and 
other firm characteristics. However, only mutual funds are likely to increase their investment 
in firms with voluntary CSP surprises. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces the institutional 
background on CSR reporting and institutional investment in China; Section 3 reviews 
relevant literature and develops hypotheses; Section 4 illustrates the research design; Section 
5 explains the sample selection and data collection; Sections 6 and 7 report the main 
empirical analyses and further tests, respectively; Section 8 discusses our findings and 
concludes the paper.  
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
The CSR concept was introduced to the Chinese equity market in 2006. The China 
Business Council for Sustainable Development issued the China CSR Recommended 
Standard and Best Practice (the Standard, hereafter) in September 2006. The Standard offers 
normative suggestions and references for Chinese listed firms to follow and use to build up 
their capability at taking social responsibility. In September 2006, the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (SZSE) issued the CSR Guide (the Guide, hereafter) to encourage firms listed on 
the SZSE to issue CSR reports along with their annual reports. The Guide particularly 
encouraged CSR reporting from firms in specific industries, such as the biotech industry, 
high-polluting industries, mining, construction etc. The Guide recommended that the CSR 
reports of listed companies included at least four dimensions: employee protection, 
environmental pollution, product quality and community. The CSR reports were also 
supposed to disclose the gap between the companies‟ CSR practices and the requirements of 
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the Guide that particularly emphasize the importance of shareholders, employees, customers, 
and environmental protection.  
Following on from these governmental signals in 2006, some large listed state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) (e.g. State Grid, COSCO, China Mobile, and Baosteel Group) began 
publishing annual CSR reports in response to the normative suggestions in the Standard and 
the Guide. The majority of Chinese listed firms did not issue CSR reports until 2008, 
however (Marquis and Qian, 2014). The Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) issued CSR 
guidelines in May 2008 to encourage CSR reporting by firms listed on the exchange. The first 
Chinese reference book providing practical guidance on preparing a CSR report was 
published in 2008 under the auspices of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (CMC) (Yin et 
al., 2008). Later, the Chinese government developed its own reporting standards for Chinese 
companies - Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Standards 1.0 and 2.0 in 2009 and 2011, 
respectively.  
After the issuance of the SHSE and CMC guidelines, CSR reporting became 
mandatory for most of the large listed firms in China. The SHSE imposed the CSR 
requirement on three types of its listed firms – about 300 constituent firms of the “Corporate 
Governance Index”, financial firms, and firms with overseas listed shares. Meanwhile, the 
SZSE imposed the CSR requirement on firms included in the SZSE 100 index. As such, 
about 400-500 of the largest listed firms on the Chinese stock market have to comply with the 
CSR requirement.   
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
Extant literature suggests that institutional investors prefer investing in firms with 
superior CSP, in developed economies. Early work by Coffey and Fryxell (1991) and Graves 
and Waddock (1994) shows that the number of institutional investors is positively related to a 
firm‟s social performance, within a model that draws on the efficient markets theory (Fama, 
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1970). However, the positive impact of firms‟ CSP on institutional investment in developed 
economies evidenced in the prior literature may be shadowed by an endogeneity concern. 
Institutional investors control the majority of the share value in developed countries and their 
attitude toward CSR could be both effect and cause – a measure of how seriously CSR is 
taken and a powerful signal to other investors about their views (Aguilera, Williams, Conley 
and Rupp, 2006). Institutional investors have incentives to actively monitor firm 
management (Pound, 1988; Shleifer and Vishney, 1986), play a role in encouraging and 
promoting CSR disclosures (Solomon, Solomon and Norton, 2002), and aim to enhance CSR 
via active ownership (Gifford, 2010).
iii
  
As mentioned above, the endogeneity is less of a concern in China. Hence, we 
examine whether firms‟ CSP attracts institutional investment in this specific research context. 
We argue that institutional investors‟ preference for firms with superior voluntary CSP can be 
explained by two benefits brought by firms‟ voluntary CSR disclosure – reduced information 
asymmetry and enhanced social capital.   
Firms‟ CSP generally provides benefits to investors by reducing the information 
asymmetry in equity markets (Cho, Lee and Pfeiffer Jr, 2013), reflecting managers‟ ethical 
concerns and driving transparent and reliable financial reporting (Kim, Park and Wier, 2012). 
Firms‟ CSP motivates voluntary CSR disclosures from both well-performing (Clarkson et al., 
2008) and poorly performing (Patten, 2002) firms. Firms with superior CSP are less likely to 
engage in accruals management or real earnings management (Kim et al., 2012). Enhanced 
corporate transparency regarding firms‟ CSP leads to a positive association between firms‟ 
voluntary CSR disclosure and their access to capital (Cheng, Ioannou and Serafeim, 2013). 
Voluntary and transparent reporting by firms reduces information asymmetry between the 
firm and its investors (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia, 2007). 
Thus, we expect superior voluntary CSP by firms to reduce the information asymmetry and 
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be relevant to equity valuation. Given the relevance of CSP to equity valuation, institutional 
investors are likely to benefit from the reduced information asymmetry brought about by 
voluntary CSR reporting, despite their superior access to timely and high-quality financial 
information on firms. Using 2008‟s melamine contamination incident in China as a natural 
experiment, iv  Wang, Qiu and Kong (2011) find that mutual funds‟ behaviours were 
significantly influenced by firms‟ voluntary CSP exceeding a certain threshold after the 
event.
v
 Based on the argument that firms‟ voluntary CSP reduces information asymmetry, we 
expect that institutional investors hold more shares in firms with superior voluntary CSP.   
Furthermore, the strength of a firm‟s CSP may to some extent represent its social 
capital. The notion of social capital suggests that CSR is the outcome of the relational 
accumulating process through which firms, especially those of a small size, build their social 
capital (Ortiz Avram and Ku¨hne, 2008). A growing number of sociologists, political 
scientists, economists, and organisational theorists have investigated the concept of social 
capital as reviewed in Adler and Kwon (2002). Social capital as a multidimensional concept 
(Paldam, 2000) has been investigated prevalently, in terms of relation networks (Burt, 1992; 
Coleman, 1988, 1990), trust and reciprocity norms (Putnam, 1993), and relational 
competences (Araujo and Easton, 1999). Social capital relates to various important aspects of 
business ethics, such as transparency, goodwill, and good citizenship (Spence, Schmidpeter 
and Habisch, 2003). We adopt the concept of social capital as trust, from Putnam (1993). 
Trust is a key parameter in CSR, as corporations see CSR as a means of demonstrating their 
legitimacy as trusted members of society, particularly following recent scandals in the US 
and Europe (Muthuri, Matten and Moon, 2009). Similarly, shared norms between the 
company and its stakeholders have been identified as vital for CSR. Carroll‟s definitions of 
CSR (1991) conceptualise „ethical responsibilities‟ as a key element of CSR, implying that a 
socially responsible company is expected to comply not only with the law but also with the 
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broader values and norms of society. As such, institutional investors may perceive a firm‟s 
voluntary CSP as a signal of its legitimacy and trust, as a social member that complies with 
the norms of society. Many large institutional investors have become involved in the effort to 
make their corporations more accountable not only for financial performance but also for 
social impacts. 
Based on the above arguments that a firm‟s voluntary CSP reduces information 
asymmetry and enhances social capital, we predict that firms with superior CSP attract more 
institutional investment, which constitutes our first set of hypotheses as set out below: 
H1a: Institutional investors invest more in firms with high voluntary CSP ratings than in 
those with low voluntary CSP ratings.  
H1b: Institutional investors are likely to increase their investment in firms with high 
voluntary CSP ratings.
 
 
Different types of institutional investors have heterogeneous preferences for firm 
characteristics (Khurshed, Lin and Wang, 2011) and firms‟ CSP (Cox et al., 2004). Only 
long-term institutional investor groups (pension funds, insurance companies and life assurors) 
prefer firms with a better CSP rating in the UK, while a negative association is observed 
between firms‟ CSP and short-term institutional investors (investment trusts) (Cox et al., 
2004).
vi
 The categorisation of institutional investors varies by country. Institutional investors 
in China typically consist of mutual funds, insurance companies, social security funds, QFIIs, 
securities companies,vii trusts, banks, financial corporations, pension funds, and non-financial 
corporations. Non-financial corporations are likely to be business associates or parent 
companies. Hence, we exclude this type of institutional investor from our research as their 
investment objectives differ greatly from those of other financial institutions. The equity 
stakes of securities companies, trusts, banks, financial corporations and pension funds are 
negligibly low in the Chinese stock market. Given that preferences over a firm‟s CSP may 
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vary across different types of institutional investors, we discuss the expected relationship 
between firms‟ voluntary CSP and the main types of institutional investors in China, namely 
mutual funds, insurance companies, social security funds and QFIIs.  
Mutual funds, as the largest group of institutional investors in China, have emerged 
and developed rapidly since 2000 (Yuan et al., 2009) as a result of regulatory efforts. In 2000, 
the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) made a strategic decision to cultivate 
the „pillar role‟ of mutual funds, among other financial institutions, in its domestic stock 
market. According to CSRC statistics, by the end of June 2007 mutual funds accounted for 
52.7% of the equity investment by institutional investors in the Chinese stock market. The 
positive association observed between mutual funds and firm performance suggests that the 
efforts of the CSRC to develop mutual funds as one of the major types of institutional 
investors have been successful (Yuan et al., 2009). Mutual funds in the US foster the 
corporate governance of their investee firms via both voice and exit governance approaches 
(Duan and Jiao, 2016).viii Although mutual funds may not actively monitor firm management 
in China as their counterparts do in developed economies, they may choose to tilt their 
investments in favour of firms with good voluntary CSP, which would also indicate prudence 
in their investment decisions made on behalf of their clients. Based on these conjectures, we 
expect firms‟ voluntary CSP to have a positive impact on the investment levels of mutual 
funds in China:  
H2a: Mutual funds invest more in firms with high voluntary CSP ratings than those with low 
voluntary CSP ratings.  
H2b: Mutual funds are likely to increase their investment in firms with high voluntary CSP 
ratings. 
Long-term institutional investors in China mainly include insurance companies and 
social security funds. Equity investments by insurance companies and social security funds 
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are restricted by the Chinese government. Insurance companies are only allowed to invest a 
maximum of 25% of their insurance funds in the Chinese stock market, according to the 
regulations of the CSRC and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC).
ix
 
Compared with insurance companies, social security funds are relatively new participants in 
the Chinese stock market and have only existed in China since 2000.
x
 The national social 
security fund serves as a strategic reserve fund, accumulated by the central government to 
support future social security expenditures and other social security needs. Initially, social 
security funds were not allowed to invest in the equity market in China. Even now, their 
investment in the equity market is limited. For instance, temporary provisions on National 
Social Security Funds Investment Management explicitly state that social security funds‟ 
investment in the equity market cannot exceed 40% of their total assets. According to CSRC 
statistics, insurance companies and social security funds respectively held 5.2% and 1.7% of 
the equity investments in the Chinese stock market in 2007.  
Insurance companies and social security funds have long-term pay-out obligations to 
their clients and hence have incentives to tilt their investment towards socially responsible 
firms. Because of their relatively predictable cash outflows, insurance companies and social 
security funds typically hold their shares in investee firms for a long period. Their long-term 
investment horizon motivates insurance companies and social security funds to act as patient 
capital and remain steady investors in investee firms. Long-term institutional investors value 
the long-term prospects of a firm, which may be strengthened by the reputation reflected in 
its CSP rating. Since financial benefits of CSP are expected to accrue in the long term, we 
expect that long-term institutional investors such as insurance companies and social security 
funds are more likely to invest in firms with better CSP. Based on these arguments, our next 
set of hypotheses is as stated below: 
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H3a: Long-term institutional investors (insurance companies and social security funds) 
invest more in firms with high voluntary CSP ratings than in those with low voluntary CSP 
ratings.  
H3b: Long-term institutional investors (insurance companies and social security funds) are 
likely to increase their investment in firms with high voluntary CSP ratings. 
Foreign institutional investors were restricted from investing directly in the Chinese 
stock market in the past. Since 2002, the Chinese government has permitted QFIIs to invest in 
its securities market (Zhang, 2001; Greenaway, Guariglia, and Yu, 2011). The QFII scheme 
represents a significant departure from China‟s traditional approach of strict capital controls. 
Foreign institutional investors only qualify if they had no less than USD 10 billion securities 
assets in the previous financial year and meet other stringent criteria that vary for different 
business types. For example, commercial banks have to be ranked among the world‟s top 100 
banks, fund management companies should have five years of operational experience, 
whereas insurance and securities firms should have 30 years of operational experience with 
paid-up capital of at least USD 1 billion.  
The QFII programme is closely scrutinised by the Chinese government, and the 
securities investment activities of QFIIs are regulated by the CSRC and the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). The CSRC has the right to decide which 
foreign investors qualify for the programme. The QFII programme does not allow for 
unrestricted repatriation of funds and requires a minimum lock-in period of one year, which 
extends to three years for closed-end funds. During the lock-in period, the funds remitted into 
China by the QFII must be held by custodians in a special-purpose RMB account. The total 
amount that QFIIs can invest in a single listed company, individually or collectively, is 
restricted by investment quotas, set by SAFE. The list of approved QFIIs and their combined 
and individual investment quotas are frequently updated by the CSRC and SAFE. Currently, 
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the amount of available shares falls short of demand, and a QFII is never assured of getting 
an allocation in any event. 
The QFII scheme is expected to lead to market-driven improvements in corporate 
governance in China, as QFIIs are all large international institutions from major developed 
countries, for example, the US, the UK, Germany, France, Japan, Canada, the Netherlands, 
and Switzerland (Liu et al., 2014). QFIIs may prefer firms with more voluntary CSR 
disclosure or better corporate governance, in China, as they do in developed markets. Using 
equity holdings from 27 countries, Ferreira and Matos (2008) show that all institutional 
investors have a strong preference for the stock of large firms and firms with good 
governance. Foreign investors domiciled in countries with good corporate governance quality 
prefer good corporate governance firms in the US (Kim, Sung and Wei, 2011; Abdioglu et al., 
2013). Based on these views, we argue that QFIIs, as selectively large institutional investors 
with global reputations, will invest more in firms with superior voluntary CSP. This leads us 
to the following:  
H4a: QFIIs invest more in firms with high voluntary CSP ratings than in those with low 
voluntary CSP ratings.  
H4b: QFIIs are likely to increase their investment in firms with high voluntary CSP ratings. 
We empirically test the above-developed hypotheses with a set of control variables for 
ownership structure, corporate governance, compensation and other firm characteristics that 
may determine the institutional investment in our sample firms. The ownership structure of 
Chinese listed firms is characterised by a high proportion of SOEs, which may have an 
impact on the link between institutional investment and firms‟ voluntary CSP. A majority of 
managers see corporate governance as a necessary pillar for sustainable CSR in developing 
countries (Jamali, Safieddine and Rabbath, 2008). Corporate governance can positively 
moderate the association between corporate financial performance and CSR (Ntim and 
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Soobaroyen, 2013). Multiple configurations of corporate governance mechanisms interact 
and combine to impact firms‟ CSR behaviour (Jain and Jamali, 2016). Executive 
compensation can be an effective tool in aligning the interests of the firm manager and 
investors, resulting in more socially responsible firms (Bebchuk, Fried and Walker, 2002; 
Johnson and Greening, 1999; Kane, 2002; Zalewski, 2003).   
RESEARCH METHODS 
We developed several multivariate regression models to test H1a, H2a, H3a, and H4a 
developed in the previous section and identify the relationship between voluntary CSP and 
institutional investment in China. 
                                                                          
                                                                
                                                                                                                  (1) 
where                         is measured as the aggregate shareholdings of all institutional 
investors (IOt), or shareholdings by mutual funds (MFt), insurance companies and social 
security funds (LTIt), or QFIIs (QFIIt), in year t. CSPt is the SNAI CSR index score in year t 
(2007). MOt is the percentage of managerial ownership in year t. SOEt is a dummy variable 
for SOEs in year t, which equals 1 for SOEs and 0 for non-SOEs. OLPt is the percentage of 
ordinary legal person ownership in year t.
xi
 Dualityt is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and board chair are the same person, and 0 otherwise. BSizet 
is the natural logarithm of the total number of board directors. MSizet is the natural logarithm 
of the total number of executive managers. BIndept is measured as the percentage of 
independent directors sitting on the board. DSalat is the natural logarithm of the average 
salary of the directors. MSalat is the natural logarithm of the average salary of the executive 
managers. Bonust is the natural logarithm of the average bonus payment to the executive 
managers. Aget is the natural logarithm of the firms‟ listing age. ROAt is the return on assets. 
Levt is the total leverage ratio, calculated as the ratio of total debts to total assets. Sizet is the 
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natural logarithm of the firms‟ total assets. Returnt is year-end adjusted share return. Inds are 
a vector of dummy variables for different industries and             ,    ).   
We estimate model (1) using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The dependent 
variables in model (1) are the shareholdings by different types of institutional investors, 
collectively and separately. The main variable of interest is CSPt. According to prior 
literature, we control for ownership structure, corporate governance, managerial 
compensation, other firm characteristics and industries when testing our hypotheses. The 
ownership structure of a firm is reflected in three variables – managerial ownership (MOt), 
state ownership (SOEs) and ordinary legal person ownership (OLPt). Corporate governance is 
measured by four variables, i.e. CEO/board-chair role duality (Dualityt), board size (BSizet), 
management size (MSizet) and board independence (BIndept). Managerial compensation is 
indicated by three measurements – directors‟ salary (DSalat), managerial salary (MSalat) and 
bonus schemes (Bonust). In addition to ownership structure, corporate governance and 
managerial compensation, we also control other firm characteristics – firm age (Aget), 
profitability (ROAt), financial leverage (Levt) and firm size (Sizet). Adjusted share return 
(Returnt) is used to control for the market conditions. Finally, industry dummy variables (Ind) 
are included to account for the possibility that the institutional investment has been 
influenced by the general practice within, or government regulation of, certain industries.  
Two approaches are used to test the effect of voluntary CSP on institutional 
investment in the subsequent year. One is to simply test the association between the 
published SNAI CSR rating (2007) and institutional investment levels in 2008. We include 
lagged values of the variables of interest to mitigate the simultaneity bias (Gupta, 2005) and 
allow for potential lagged effects of firms‟ voluntary CSP on subsequent institutional 
investment. We developed the following lead-lag regression model to test our hypotheses by 
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identifying the impacts of firms‟ CSP ratings on the institutional investment in the subsequent 
financial year: 
                                                                           
                                                                     
                                                                                 (2) 
where the variables are defined similarly to those in model (1) and             ,    ).  
The other approach is more sophisticatedly designed to reflect the nature of the 
institutional investor, who may be able to identify investee firms with unexpectedly good 
voluntary CSP. We split the voluntary CSP of firms into two components – expected and 
unexpected. The unexpected voluntary CSP contains information surprises to institutional 
investors. We developed the following two-stage model: 
                                                                    
                                                              
                    +   
                                                                            
                                                              
                                                            
                                                                                                                   (3) 
Where,   is the regression error in the first-stage regression. In the second-stage regression, 
CSPSurprise t is the estimated residual (  ) from the linear regression for the voluntary CSP of 
the sample firms in year t; the other variables are defined in the same way as in the previous 
models. 
In the first-stage equation of model (3), a firm‟s voluntary CSP is determined by the 
ownership structure, corporate governance, compensation and other firm characteristics in the 
same year, and its regression residual (   is obtained to measure the unexpected voluntary 
CSP surprise. In the second-stage equation, we replace the firm‟s voluntary CSP in model (2) 
with its voluntary CSP surprise that cannot be explained by ownership structure, corporate 
governance, compensation and other firm or industry factors. 
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After considering the impacts of firms‟ voluntary CSP and surprise voluntary CSP on 
the institutional investment pattern in the same and subsequent years, it is natural to ask 
whether those things affect institutional trading behaviour. The fact that only one year‟s 
voluntary CSR rating is available allows us to test whether firms‟ voluntary CSP encourages 
institutional investors to increase their shareholdings subsequently, with little endogeneity 
concern. We test H1b, H2b, H3b and H4b on increases in institutional shareholdings using 
both the firms‟ voluntary CSP and the surprises in their voluntary CSP. It would be ideal to 
examine the purchase transactions of institutional investors, but they are unfortunately not 
available for our sample firms. Hence, we use increases in institutional investment as a proxy.  
One approach is to simply analyse whether institutional investors are likely to 
increase their investment in firms with good voluntary CSP. Since the ownership stakes of 
managers, the state and ordinary legal persons, corporate governance and compensation 
levels are stable or sticky over two consecutive years, we only include the changes in firms‟ 
profitability, financial leverage and firm size in the regressions below. We have 
                                                                        
                                                                                                                      (4) 
where                               are four dummy variables, i.e.                     , 
          , and              indicating increases in institutional ownership in general or 
shareholdings by mutual funds, long-term institutional investors and QFIIs, respectively, 
from year t to year t+1;           is the change in return on assets from year t to year t+1; 
          is the change in financial leverage from year t to year t+1;            is the change 
in firm size from year t to year t+1; Returnt,t+1 is the annual share return from year t to year 
t+1;            ,    ).   
Similarly, the other approach is to test whether institutional investors are likely to 
increase their investment in firms with voluntary CSP surprises. According to the efficient 
market hypothesis, investors only trade on unexpected information, as this type of 
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information affects the market performance of stocks whereas expected information has 
already been incorporated into share prices. We developed the following models to test 
whether institutional investors are likely to increase their investment in firms with voluntary 
CSP surprises: 
                                                                    
                                                              
                    +   
                                      
  
    
                 
             
           
  
                                                                                                                          (5) 
where all variables are defined as in the previous models. 
The first-stage equation of model (5) is the same as that for model (3). The second-
stage equation of model (5) tests whether institutional investors increase their shareholding 
levels according to the unexpected voluntary CSP – the „Surprises‟ in firms‟ voluntary CSP.  
SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA COLLECTION 
The initial sample includes 1,494 Chinese listed firms covered in the SNAI CSR 
index. Although the SNAI CSR index was officially published in 2008, it was generated 
based on the voluntary CSR disclosures of listed firms in 2007. Due to merger and 
acquisition transactions, 18 firms are excluded from the sample, which reduces the sample 
size to 1,476. Furthermore, 15 financial firms are excluded from the sample because their 
accounting system is different from that of other firms. This exclusion reduces our sample 
size to 1,461, out of which a further 31 firms with missing data were omitted from the 
regression analyses, leading to a final sample size of 1,430. This makes our sample size much 
larger than those of some prior studies (Gao, 2009; Zu and Song, 2009; Wang et al., 2011). 
The SNAI CSR index system (2007) was formulated according to the SA8000 
standard issued by Social Accountability International (SAI). The general motivation for 
issuing the CSR index was to encourage Chinese listed firms to make more CSR disclosures 
and improve firm value. The system attempts to provide a broad measure for CSR (Li and 
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Zhang, 2010), consists of most dimensions of CSR debated in the literature, and captures the 
full picture of firms‟ voluntary CSP. The index groups 36 questions into 8 categories: 
environment, energy-saving, employees, employment and promotion equality, social 
problems, customer satisfaction, other stakeholders, and law-abiding / ethics.
 
Each criterion 
includes various sub-criteria, as illustrated in Appendix 2. Although the index provides scores 
for all the sub-criteria, no single measure for the eight criteria has been generated. To arrive 
at a single measure for these eight criteria, we calculate the weighted sum of the number-
grade ratings for each attribute.  
Institutional ownership and the identities of all types of institutional investors were 
collected from the database provided by Wind Information Co., Ltd. We collected the data on 
corporate governance from the annual reports of the listed companies. Firm-level accounting 
and market data were obtained from the Guo Tai An (GTA) and China Stock Market and 
Accounting Research (CSMAR) databases. Both databases have often been used in previous 
studies on Chinese stock market accounting and finance research (see Liu et al., 2014).  
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the empirical analyses. 
We winsorise outlying observations of two variables (ROA and Leverage) at the top and 
bottom 1%. Panel A of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the aggregate institutional 
ownership and shareholdings by different types of institutional investors. Our sample firms 
have about 21.77% and 26.18% aggregate institutional ownership in year t and t+1, 
respectively. Panel B of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the SNAI CSR index (2007) 
and the disaggregated scores for each of the eight criteria. Panel C of Table 1 shows 
descriptive statistics for the ownership structure and corporate governance variables. Panel D 
of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for compensation and other firm characteristics, 
including firm age, profitability, leverage, firm size, and share market performance.  
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Table 2 reports the correlation matrix of the variables used in the empirical analyses. 
The correlation results show that only investments by institutional investors (IOt) and mutual 
funds (MFt) are highly correlated, at 0.85 with a 1% significance level. Since we analyse 
these two variables separately, there is no concern over multicollinearity in our regression 
analyses. 
 
EMPIRICAL TESTS 
Table 3 report the regression results for model (1). We exclude one industry dummy, 
Ind16 (Conglomerate), from the regressions and use this as the reference industry. The 
reported regression results for the linear model (1) show that institutional investment is 
generally higher in firms with better voluntary CSP after controlling for corporate governance, 
compensation, ownership structure and other firm characteristics. Therefore, the empirical 
results reported in Table 3 support our prediction in H1a. Similarly to Liu et al. (2014), we 
find institutional investors generally show no preference for firms whose CEO and board 
chair are the same person. Institutional investors overall hold a higher percentage of shares in 
Chinese firms with large sizes of management teams and fewer independent directors. The 
negative association between institutional investment and board independence is opposite to 
the evidence from developed countries. For instance, Khurshed, Lin and Wang (2011) find 
institutional investors in the UK invest more in firms with more independent (non-executive) 
directors. The negative relation between institutional investment and board independence 
may suggest sceptism over the monitoring role of independent directors in China, and that it 
is viewed negatively by institutional investors in their decision making. Institutional investors 
also invest more in firms with high managerial salaries. As for financial characteristics, 
institutional investors in China hold a high level of shareholdings in large firms, firms with 
high leverage ratios, and those with superior market performance.  
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The investment pattern of the institutional investors is largely determined by the 
domestic mutual funds. Mutual funds invest more in firms with better voluntary CSP, 
supporting our prediction in H2a. Mutual funds also prefer firms with higher managerial 
ownership, higher managerial salaries, of a larger size and with more financial leverage but 
invest less in firms with more independent directors. However, institutional investors 
generally invest more in firms in which ordinary legal persons (OLP) hold a high percentage 
of shares but mutual funds invest less in such firms. Mutual funds in China, similarly to those 
in developed economies, prefer investing in stocks with superior market performance. 
Long-term institutional investors (insurance companies and social security funds) 
invest more in firms with a smaller board size but a larger firm size. We also observe a 
positive association between the shareholding level of these long-term institutional investors 
in a firm, and the firm‟s stock market performance.  
However, it is a surprise to observe that foreign institutional investors (QFIIs) invest 
more in firms with role duality of CEO and board chair because extant literature suggests that 
such duality indicates poor corporate governance. The empirical results for QFIIs also show 
that they invest more in firms with well-paid managers. These findings suggest that foreign 
institutional investors, even coming from countries with high corporate governance standards, 
show no preference for firms with higher corporate governance status or fairness in 
managerial compensation when investing in emerging markets. Our empirical evidence on 
foreign institutional investors‟ investment behaviour in China is surprisingly counter to the 
implications of prior literature (Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Aggarwal et al., 2011). Ferreira 
and Matos (2008) find that institutional investors prefer large and liquid stocks in firms with 
good corporate governance practice, especially in countries where country-level investor 
protection and quality of institutions are weak. Aggarwal et al. (2011) argue that foreign 
institutional investors from countries with strong shareholder protection play a role in 
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promoting governance in their investee companies abroad. However, based on our empirical 
evidence, it seems that the Chinese government‟s hope that these reputable foreign 
institutional investors might improve the corporate governance of Chinese firms is not being 
met.   
 
The regression results for model (2) reported in Table 4 are generally consistent with 
those reported in Table 3. Institutional investors in general hold high levels of shareholdings 
in the subsequent year, in firms with superior voluntary CSP in the current year. Mutual 
funds and QFIIs in particular determine this investment pattern of institutional investors. The 
results for other control variables are largely consistent with those reported in Table 3, with a 
few exceptions. For instance, long-term institutional investors invest less in SOEs. 
Institutional investors, especially mutual funds, do not make large equity investments in firms 
with large sizes of management teams. Moreover, we observe that institutional investors in 
general, and mutual funds in particular, invest more in firms with more managerial ownership, 
consistent with the argument in prior literature that managerial ownership suggests an 
alignment between the interests of managers and investors. Institutional investors perceive 
managerial ownership as an efficient corporate governance mechanism in TEEs such as 
China. Furthermore, the positive association between institutional investment and managerial 
ownership may reflect the trust between institutional investors and firm managers, which may 
also lead to a positive link between institutional investment and managerial salaries. Mutual 
funds invest more in firms whose managers and directors are well paid.   
 
Table 5 reports regression results for the two-stage model (3). The first column of 
Table 5 shows results for the first-stage regression. In the second-stage regressions we 
replace firms‟ voluntary CSP with surprises in voluntary CSP, measured as the regression 
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residuals from the first stage. Therefore, voluntary CSP surprises capture the unexpected 
component in voluntary CSP that cannot be explained by corporate governance, 
compensation, ownership structure and other firm characteristics. The second-stage 
regression results show that institutional investors in general, and mutual funds and QFIIs in 
particular, invest more in firms with greater voluntary CSP surprises. The results for the other 
variables are consistent with those reported in Table 4.  
We now move on to testing whether institutional investors are likely to increase their 
investment in firms with superior voluntary CSP. Table 6 reports regression results for model 
(4), testing this likelihood. In support of H2b, H3b and H4b, we find major types of 
institutional investors in China – mutual funds, long-term domestic institutional investors 
(insurance companies and social security funds) and QFIIs – are likely to increase their 
investment in firms with superior voluntary CSP. The likelihood of increased investment in 
the subsequent year increases by 1% if the voluntary CSP ranking is one point higher. 
However, other types of institutional investors may not increase their investment in firms 
with superior voluntary CSP, and some institutional investors with short-term investment 
horizons may even sell shares in these firms for transient profits. This may be a plausible 
explanation for the finding of an insignificant link between the likelihood of increased 
aggregate institutional ownership and firms‟ voluntary CSP. Our H1b is therefore rejected 
based on the empirical evidence in Table 6. As for the other variables, increases in financial 
leverage and stock market performance significantly enhance the likelihood of investment by 
mutual funds.   
 
Alternatively, we test the likelihood that institutional investors increase their 
investment in firms with voluntary CSP surprises. Table 7 reports regression results from the 
two-stage model (5). The results of the first-stage regression are the same as those reported in 
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the first column of Table 5. In the second-stage regression, we test whether voluntary CSP 
surprises enhance the likelihood of increases in institutional investment, and find that only 
mutual funds are likely to increase their investment in firms with voluntary CSP surprises. 
This finding, when combined with those from Table 5, implies that, although mutual funds 
and QFIIs value voluntary CSP, only mutual funds are likely to trade on unexpected 
voluntary CSP surprises. The coefficients of voluntary CSP surprises are still positive for 
long-term institutional investors and QFIIs but no longer significant, which may be 
attributable to the low trading volumes of these types of institutional investors, whose equity 
stakes in the Chinese stock market are much smaller than those of mutual funds. The 
coefficients for the control variables are consistent with those reported in Table 6. 
 
FURTHER ANALYSES 
According to Panel A of Table 1, the aggregate institutional ownership is about 21-26% 
in 2007 and 2008. The shareholdings of most of the institutional investors are lower than 5%, 
a common threshold used in previous studies (Chung et al., 2002; Dechow et al., 1996) to 
identify institutional investors that play a significant role in constraining managerial 
discretion in the US. The influencing power of institutional investors with less than 5% 
ownership, over investee firms‟ CSP, is unlikely to be material unless they form a coalition. 
However, according to Xi (2006), the collective action problem and natural rivalry among 
institutional investors create barriers to co-operation.  
Although we believe our empirical results are not affected by the reverse causality 
problem, we conduct 2SLS regressions to address the concern of a possible influence from 
institutional investors over firms‟ CSP. The ideal approach would be to employ an 
instrumental variable strategy to address the endogeneity concern. However, it is common in 
corporate governance research that the data do not provide plausible valid instruments 
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(Wintoki, Linck and Netter, 2012). We notice that board gender diversity has a positive 
impact on the CSR ratings of Chinese firms (McGuinness, Vieito and Wang, 2017) but no 
significant impact on institutional investment has been evidenced in prior literature. As such 
we use board gender diversity as the instrumental variable in our 2SLS regressions to further 
address the endogeneity concern. The following 2SLS regression models were developed: 
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where FDt is the percentage of female directors on the board, and the other variables are 
defined as in models (1-5). 
Table 8 reports the 2SLS regression results. The results of the first-stage regression 
suggest that firms with more female directors sitting on boards have superior CSP. The 
second-stage regression results show that firms‟ CSP has significantly positive impacts on the 
investment levels of different types of institutional investors, jointly or separately, after 
controlling for the reverse causality problem.   
 
A good aggregate CSR rating will include a consistent range of important social 
issues that are uniformly measured across a wide range of companies (Graves and Waddock, 
1994). Carroll (1979) emphasises the fundamentally multidimensional nature of the CSR 
rating construct. Griffin and Mahon (1997) suggest that firms‟ CSP should be disaggregated 
into its individual components so as to avoid the information losses associated with 
aggregation into a single construct. Following this suggestion, we conduct further analyses on 
the eight constituent constructs of the SNAI CSR index that reflect specific dimensions of the 
overall CSR ratings of our sample firms.  
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As discussed earlier, the SNAI CSR index comprises data concerning eight criteria: 
environment, energy-saving, employees, equality, social, customers, stakeholders, and law-
abiding/ ethics. We manually calculate the weighted sum of scores for each CSP criteria and 
use them to analyse whether and how institutional investors are related to the constituent 
components of firms‟ voluntary CSP.  
We replace the independent variable (CSP) of model (2) with the voluntary CSP 
scores for each of the eight criteria to analyse associations between the eight criteria and 
different types of institutional investors. The regressions results are reported in Table 9. Our 
further tests for the disaggregated voluntary CSP suggest that mutual funds invest more in 
firms achieving higher voluntary CSP with respect to equality and customers, but less in 
those doing well at saving energy. Again, the investment pattern of institutional investors in 
general is driven by mutual funds. Insurance companies and social security funds invest more 
in firms that take care of their customers. QFIIs are the only type of institutional investors 
that prefer investing in firms that achieve better CSP in terms of saving energy. The 
regression results for the other variables are the same as those reported in Table 4.  
 
We further replace the aggregate voluntary CSP in model (4) by the voluntary CSP 
scores for each of the eight criteria, to analyse the impact of the eight aspects of voluntary 
CSP on the likelihood of increased institutional investment. The regressions results are 
reported in Table 10. We observe that mutual funds are likely to increase their investment in 
firms that have better voluntary CSP in terms of the environment and customers, but are 
likely to decrease their investment in those doing better at saving energy. Domestic insurance 
companies and social security funds (LTIs) are likely to increase their investment in firms 
taking better care of their customers. However, QFIIs are likely to increase their investment 
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in firms doing better at saving energy and taking care of society. The regression results for 
the other variables are the same as those reported in Table 6.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study investigates the pattern of institutional investment in China and whether 
listed firms‟ voluntary CSP has shaped investment by institutional investors in general, and 
mutual funds, insurance companies, social security funds and QFIIs in particular. Our 
empirical evidence, obtained by analysing a sample of 1,430 listed companies in China, 
shows that institutional investments in current and subsequent years are positively associated 
with firms‟ voluntary CSP. Mutual funds are the main driver of this investment pattern of 
domestic institutional investors. Both mutual funds and QFIIs invest more in firms with better 
voluntary CSP or with more surprises in voluntary CSP that cannot be explained by the 
firm‟s corporate governance, ownership structure and other firm characteristics. Mutual funds, 
insurance companies, social security funds and QFIIs are likely to increase their investment 
in firms with superior voluntary CSP. Our 2SLS regression results show that, after 
controlling for the endogenous effect of institutional investment, firms‟ CSP has significant 
impacts on the shareholding levels of different types of institutional investors, collectively 
and separately.  
Furthermore, we find that the unexpected component of voluntary CSP, i.e. surprises, 
contains valuable information for institutional investors. Institutional investment by mutual 
funds, insurance companies, social security funds and QFIIs is significantly higher in firms 
with more surprises in voluntary CSP, in the year after the CSP became public information. 
Particularly, domestic mutual funds are likely to increase their investment in firms with 
surprises in their voluntary CSP. This finding suggests that positive surprises in CSP are 
detected and valued by institutional investors in the Chinese equity market.  
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Our additional tests on the disaggregated voluntary CSP suggest that mutual funds 
invest more in firms achieving higher voluntary CSP with respect to equality and customers 
but less in those doing well at saving energy. Insurance companies and social security funds 
invest more in firms that take care of their customers. QFIIs are the only type of institutional 
investors that prefer to invest in firms achieving better CSP in terms of saving energy. 
The empirical evidence shows that firms‟ voluntary CSP generally attracts more 
investment from institutional investors, especially domestic mutual funds and QFIIs. 
However, different from the evidence from developed markets, so-called long-term 
institutional investors (insurance companies and social security funds) do not show consistent 
evidence of preferring to invest in firms with good voluntary CSP. Our tests on the eight 
constituent components of voluntary CSP suggest that institutional investors have 
heterogeneous preferences for the various dimensions of firms‟ voluntary CSP. Domestic 
institutional investors pay more attention to firms‟ voluntary CSP with regards to customers, 
whereas only QFIIs prefer investing in firms with good voluntary CSP with regards energy-
saving. These findings reflect that environmental and energy issues are still overlooked by 
domestic institutional investors.  
Our findings in this paper contribute to the literature on the link between institutional 
investors and the voluntary CSP of firms in an emerging market – China. We find that, 
consistent with prior evidence from developed economies, institutional investors are attracted 
to firms with superior voluntary CSP. In other words, firms‟ voluntary CSP does shape 
institutional investment in an emerging market. Domestic institutional investors such as 
mutual funds, rather than foreign, are driving this investment pattern of institutional investors. 
Foreign institutional investors invest more in firms with better voluntary CSP, which may 
further foster the awareness of CSR issues and raise concerns on energy-saving and 
environmental issues in developing countries. However, foreign institutional investors do not 
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show a significant preference towards firms with better corporate governance mechanisms in 
emerging economies.  
Our paper therefore offers important implications for policy makers in emerging 
countries. According to our results, social security funds that are regulated and controlled by 
the Chinese government invest more in firms with better CSP in terms of respect for 
employees. QFIIs, as respectful global institutional investors selected by the Chinese 
government, also invest more in Chinese listed firms with better CSP, particularly with 
regards energy-saving and social issues. These findings suggest that the governments of 
emerging countries can foster the CSP of firms in their domicile via their agent investors or 
by monitoring foreign institutional investors.   
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Deviation Min Max 
Panel A: Institutional Investment     
IOt (Institutional Ownership) 21.77 20.47 0.00 100.00 
IOt+1 26.18 21.26 0.00 100.00 
MFt (Mutual Funds) 17.68 19.23 0.00 85.14 
MFt+1 16.15 17.89 0.00 77.98 
ICt (Insurance Companies) 2.75 2.60 0.17 20.57 
IC t+1 2.99 2.73 0.22 17.91 
SSFt (Social Security Funds) 3.43 2.82 0.46 16.22 
SSF t+1 2.62 2.29 0.16 11.20 
QFIIt 3.12 3.14 0.20 16.71 
QFII t+1 2.36 2.32 0.16 16.06 
Panel B: CSP     
CSPt (Total CSR Score) 27.91 11.25 -1.32 76.34 
C1 (Environment score) 2.04 2.79 -4.12 21.43 
C2 (Energy-saving score) 2.03 2.75 0.00 17.31 
C3 (Employees score) 7.62 2.22 1.65 15.66 
C4 (Equality score) 2.84 1.51 0.00 9.07 
C5 (Social score) 0.94 1.22 -1.65 11.54 
C6 (Customers score) 3.35 2.32 -2.47 14.01 
C7 (Stakeholders score) 5.97 6.81 -13.19 25.56 
C8 (Law-abiding and Ethics) 3.38 1.37 -3.30 11.54 
Panel C: Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance    
MOt 3.31 11.61 0.00 75.00 
SOEt 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00 
OLPt (Ordinary Legal Persons) 9.95 10.11 0.13 86.38 
Dualityt 0.15 0.35 0 1 
BSizet 9.06 2.42 0 18 
MSizet 5.94 2.55 0.00 22.00 
BIndept 35.07 7.40 0.00 66.67 
Panel D: Compensation and other Firm Characteristics   
DSalaryt 806994.7 932085.3 0 13900000 
MSalaryt 926369.3 993932.5 0 15700000 
Bonust 14060.95 62466.54 0.00 805000.00 
Aget 13.55 4.18 2.14 27.56 
ROAt 0.02 0.24 -4.25 0.43 
ROAt+1 -0.05 0.96 -18.92 0.50 
Levt 0.51 0.20 0.00 1 
Levt+1 0.50 0.20 0.02 1 
Sizet 21.36 1.40 0.00 26.25 
Sizet+1 21.45 1.33 10.84 26.57 
Returnt+1 -0.02 0.03 -0.10 0.10 
Returnt,t+1 -0.58 0.22 -0.87 4.10 
 
Note: BSizet, MSizet, DSalat, MSalat, Bonust, Aget, Sizet and Sizet+1 are original numbers before taking natural 
logarithms.  
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
 
 
CSPt IOt MFt LTIt QFIIt MOt SOEt OLPt Dualityt BSizet MSizet BIndept DSalaryt MSalaryt Bonust Aget ROAt Levt Sizet 
IOt 0.19
a 
                 
 
MFt 0.20
a 0.85a 
                
 
LTIt 0.07
a 0.33a 0.29a 
               
 
QFIIt 0.05
b 0.18a 0.11a 0.03 
              
 
MOt 0.09
a -0.06b 0.00 0.00 -0.02 
             
 
SOEt 0.09
a 0.12a 0.11a 0.06b 0.03 -0.34a 
            
 
OLPt 0.00 0.46
a -0.05c 0.00 0.05c -0.13a 0.04 
           
 
Dualityt -0.05
c -0.05b -0.04 -0.02 0.03 0.11a -0.14a -0.04 
          
 
BSizet 0.09
a 0.06b 0.05c -0.03 0.03 -0.05b 0.11 0.04c -0.03 
         
 
MSizet 0.15
a 0.09a 0.10a 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.16a 0.00 0.01 0.55a 
        
 
BIndept 0.04 -0.06
b -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.50a 0.44a 
       
 
DSalaryt 0.08
a 0.11a 0.12a 0.04 0.03 0.06b -0.04c 0.03 0.03 0.07a 0.12a 0.01 
      
 
MSalaryt 0.15
a 0.25a 0.23a 0.07a 0.08a -0.01 0.10a 0.08a 0.01 0.10a 0.14a 0.03 0.48a 
     
 
Bonust 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.04 
    
 
Aget -0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.02
 -0.01 0.05c -0.02 -0.06b 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 
   
 
ROAt 0.06
b 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.05c 0.02 -0.05b 0.01 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 
  
 
Levt -0.07
a -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.17a 0.07b 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 
 
 
Sizet 0.31
a 0.38a 0.38a 0.14a 0.06b -0.14a 0.31a 0.08a -0.10a 0.15a 0.18a 0.01 0.19a 0.30a -0.02 0.00 0.20a -0.27a  
Returnt 0.06
b 0.18a 0.16a 0.08a 0.04 0.18a -0.06b 0.08a -0.06b 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.09a -0.07b -0.02 0.01 -0.00 0.02 0.01 
 
Notes: 
1. P values are reported in parentheses. a, b, and c indicate significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively, for t tests. 
2. Please refer to Appendix 1 for the definition of variables. 
 
  
  
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
Table 3: Does better voluntary CSP attract more institutional investment simultaneously? 
 
 
IOt MFt LTIt QFIIt 
Constant -11.10*** -10.06*** -2.71* -1.15 
 (-7.93) (-8.02) (-2.00) (-0.98) 
CSPt 0.11** 0.09** 0.00 0.00 
 (2.97) (2.68) (0.80) (1.32) 
MOt 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.00 
 (1.00) (0.37) (0.31) (0.56) 
SOEt 0.01 -0.11 0.06 0.00 
 (0.01) (-0.11) (0.63) (0.03) 
OLPt 0.90*** -0.13** -0.00 0.00 
 (19.91) (-3.12) (-0.24) (1.29) 
Dualityt -0.59 -0.50 -0.03 0.15 
 (-0.47) (-0.42) (-0.23) (1.44) 
BSizet -0.14 -0.06 -0.23† 0.09 
 (-0.11) (-0.05) (-1.89) (0.84) 
MSizet 2.18* 2.09† 0.15 -0.02 
 (2.08) (1.91) (1.34) (-0.21) 
BIndept -0.22** -0.20** 0.00 0.00 
 (-3.09) (-3.21) (-0.65) (-0.71) 
DSalaryt -0.18 -0.09 0.00 0.00 
 (-0.89) (-0.46) (0.02) (-0.19) 
MSalaryt 1.92*** 1.66*** 0.03 0.06† 
 (4.96) (4.54) (0.84) (1.99) 
Bonust -2.08 -2.27 -0.13 -0.04 
 (-1.33) (-1.53) (-0.88) (-0.30) 
Aget 0.94 1.04 -0.02 -0.03 
 (1.13) (1.32) (-0.27) (-0.36) 
ROAt -4.38** -4.83** -0.04 0.05 
 (-2.32) (-2.71) (-0.24) (0.32) 
Levt -5.79** -4.63* -0.18 -0.13 
 (-2.48) (2.10) (-0.79) (-0.65) 
Sizet 4.72*** 4.48*** 0.14*** 0.01 
 (12.33) (12.37) (3.70) (0.31) 
Returnt 0.47** 0.37* 0.05*** -0.01 
 (2.94) (2.44) (3.25) (-0.40) 
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
No. of Obs. 1430 1430 1430 1430 
Adjusted R
2
 36.72% 19.61% 2.29% 1.01% 
 
Notes:  
1. †, *,**, and *** indicate significance levels at 10%, 5% ,1% and 0.1%, respectively, for t tests. 
2. Please refer to Appendix 1 for the definition of variables. 
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Table 4: Does better voluntary CSP lead to more institutional investment subsequently? 
 
 
IOt+1 MFt+1 LTIt+1 QFIIt+1 
Constant -9.78*** -9.37*** -4.45*** -0.84 
 (-7.40) (-7.53) (-3.26) (-1.25) 
CSPt 0.07* 0.06† 0.00 0.01* 
 (2.08) (1.86) (0.58) (2.12) 
MOt+1 0.07† 0.07* 0.00 0.01 
 (1.68) (2.06) (0.20) (0.15) 
SOEt+1 -0.11 -0.01 -0.22* 0.01 
 (-0.11) (-0.01) (-2.05) (0.15) 
OLPt+1 0.89*** -0.11*** -0.01* 0.00 
 (30.96) (-3.96) (-2.36) (0.38) 
Dualityt+1 1.05 1.08 0.06 0.10 
 (0.88) (0.97) (0.45) (1.61) 
BSizet+1 0.57 0.25 -0.13 0.00 
 (0.48) (0.23) (-1.03) (-0.03) 
MSizet+1 1.05 1.08 -0.04 -0.01 
 (0.95) (1.08) (-0.36) (-0.26) 
BIndept+1 -0.16* -0.13* 0.00 0.00 
 (-2.34) (-2.17) (-0.03) (-0.38) 
DSalaryt+1 0.24 0.28† 0.03 -0.01 
 (1.29) (1.68) (1.54) (-1.13) 
MSalaryt+1 0.72† 0.72* 0.00 0.02 
 (1.90) (2.08) (-0.04) (1.11) 
Bonust+1 -0.67 -0.86 -0.03 0.02 
 (-0.45) (-0.63) (-0.17) (0.22) 
Aget+1 0.99 0.96 -0.09 -0.04 
 (1.25) (1.23) (-1.02) (-0.92) 
ROAt+1 -0.38 -0.53 0.02 0.01 
 (-0.34) (-0.52) (0.20) (0.16) 
Levt+1 -1.99 -2.30 -0.22 -0.17† 
 (-0.99) (-1.24) (-1.00) (-1.66) 
Sizet+1 4.48*** 4.08*** 0.26*** 0.05** 
 (11.82) (11.65) (6.18) (2.40) 
Returnt+1 0.89*** 0.75*** 0.04** 0.01 
 (5.83) (5.36) (2.64) (1.44) 
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
No. of Obs. 1430 1430 1430 1430 
Adjusted R
2
 50.16% 18.13% 5.60% 0.94% 
 
Notes:  
1. †, *,**, and *** indicate significance levels at 10%, 5% ,1% and 0.1%, respectively, for t tests. 
2. Please refer to Appendix 1 for the definition of variables. 
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Table 5: Does voluntary CSP surprises lead to more institutional investment subsequently? 
 
Stage 1: CSPt Stage 2: IOt+1 MFt+1 LTIt+1 QFIIt+1 
Constant -49.86*** Constant -100.03*** -93.82*** -4.80*** -0.95 
 (-4.85)  (-7.57) (-7.68) (-3.26) (-1.44) 
  CSPSurprise,t 0.06† 0.05† 0.00 0.00* 
   (1.79) (1.65) (0.34) (2.03) 
MOt 0.12*** MOt+1 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.00 
 (3.98)  (1.02) (1.45) (-0.55) (0.41) 
SOEt -0.63 SOEt+1 0.00 0.08 -0.21* 0.01 
 (-0.83)  (0.00) (0.09) (-2.02) (0.25) 
OLPt 0.01 OLPt+1 0.88*** -0.12*** -0.01** 0.00 
 (-0.15)  (30.73) (-4.42) (-2.58) (0.28) 
Dualityt -1.77† Dualityt+1 0.62 0.71 -0.08 0.09 
 (-1.90)  (0.52) (0.65) (-0.60) (1.45) 
BSizet 0.53 BSt+1 0.32 0.04 -0.15 0.00 
 (0.57)  (0.27) (0.04) (-1.13) (-0.08) 
MSizet 1.73* MSt+1 1.18 1.23 -0.04 -0.01 
 (2.02)  (1.08) (1.22) (-0.33) (-0.14) 
BIndept -0.01 IDt+1 -0.15* -0.13* 0.00 0.00 
 (-0.22)  (-2.21) (-2.05) (-0.18) (-0.38) 
DSalaryt -0.13 DSalaryt+1 0.19 0.24 0.02 -0.01 
 (-0.85)  (1.00) (1.38) (1.20) (-1.20) 
MSalaryt 0.52† MSalaryt+1 0.72† 0.72* 0.00 0.02 
 (1.81)  (1.93) (2.10) (-0.08) (1.14) 
Bonust 2.04† Bonust+1 -0.36 -0.54 -0.02 0.02 
 (1.76)  (-0.25) (-0.40) (-0.13) (0.30) 
Aget -0.34 Aget+1 0.79 0.87 -0.09 -0.05 
 (-0.55)  (1.01) (1.20) (-1.04) (-1.20) 
ROAt -1.09 ROAt+1 -0.33 -0.49 0.03 0.01 
 (-0.78)  (-0.30) (-0.48) (0.22) (0.17) 
Levt -6.06*** Levt+1 -2.13 -2.42 0.21 -0.17† 
 (-3.84)  (-1.07) (-1.32) (0.97) (-1.67) 
Sizet 3.17*** Sizet+1 4.69*** 4.25*** 0.27*** 0.05** 
 (11.71)  (13.06) (12.80) (6.64) (3.04) 
  Return t+1 0.89*** 0.75*** 0.04** 0.01 
   (5.82) (5.35) (2.65) (1.43) 
Industry Controlled Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
No. of Obs. 1430 No. of Obs. 1430 1430 1430 1430 
Adjusted R
2
 19.60% Adjusted R
2
 50.13% 18.10% 5.59% 0.93% 
 
Notes:  
1. *,**, and *** indicate significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively, for t and for z tests. 
2. Please refer to Appendix 1 for the definition of variables. 
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Table 6: Are institutional investors likely to increase investments in firms with better voluntary CSP? 
 
 
Prob(+ΔIOt,t+1) Prob(+ΔMFt,t+1) Prob(+ΔLTIt,t+1) Prob(+ΔQFIIt,t+1) 
Constant -0.05 -4.76 -5.01 -5.15 
 (-0.05) (-0.06) (-0.04) (-0.03) 
CSPt 0.00 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.09) (3.89) (4.17) (3.02) 
ΔROAt,t+1 0.01 -0.05 0.02 0.15 
 0.18 (-0.60) (0.22) (1.03) 
ΔLevt,t+1 0.37** 0.40*** -0.07 0.08 
 (2.82) (4.69) (-0.43) (0.36) 
ΔSizet,t+1 -0.08 -0.09 0.07 0.08 
 (-1.31) (-0.64) (1.35) (1.26) 
Return t,t+1 1.04*** 1.00*** -0.03 0.25 
 (6.35) (6.10) (-1.14) (1.03) 
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
No. of Obs. 1430 1430 1430 1430 
LR χ 2 72.13 56.96 46.78 22.14 
 
Notes:  
1. †, *,**, and *** indicate significance levels at 10%, 5% ,1% and 0.1%, respectively, for z tests reported in 
parentheses. 
2. LR χ 2 is the likelihood ratio χ 2 for Probit regressions. 
3. Return t,t+1 is the annual adjusted share return from year t to year t+1. Please refer to Appendix 1 for the 
definition of other variables. 
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Table 7: Are institutional investors likely to increase investments in firms with voluntary CSP surprises? 
 
Stage 1: CSPt Stage 2: Prob(+ΔIOt,t+1) Prob(+ΔMFt,t+1) Prob(+ΔLTIt,t+1) Prob(+ΔQFIIt,t+1) 
Constant -49.86*** Constant 0.59 -4.73 -4.71 -4.84 
 (-4.85)  (0.67) (-0.04) (0.04) (-0.03) 
MOt 0.12*** CSPSurprise,t 0.00 0.01* 0.00 0.01 
 (3.98)  (0.13) (1.92) (1.16) (1.29) 
SOEt -0.63 ΔROAt,t+1 0.02 -0.06 0.01 0.13 
 (-0.83)  (0.20) (-0.73) (0.08) (0.88) 
OLPt 0.01 ΔLevt,t+1 0.36*** 0.38*** -0.09 0.07 
 (-0.15)  (2.80) (4.57) (-0.58) (0.30) 
Dualityt -1.77† ΔSizet,t+1 -0.07 -0.11 0.07 0.04 
 (-1.90)  (-1.30) (-0.77) (1.26) (0.54) 
BSizet 0.53 Return t,t+1 1.05*** 1.01*** 0.06 0.24 
 (0.57)  (6.38) (6.12) (0.27) (0.96) 
MSizet 1.73*      
 (2.02)      
BIndept -0.01      
 (-0.22)      
DSalaryt -0.13      
 (-0.85)      
MSalaryt 0.52†      
 (1.81)      
Bonust 2.04†      
 (1.76)      
Aget -0.34      
 (-0.55)      
ROAt -1.09      
 (-0.78)      
Levt -6.06***      
 (-3.84)      
Sizet 3.17***      
 (11.71)      
Industry Controlled Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
No. of Obs. 1430 No. of Obs. 1430 1430 1430 1430 
Adjusted R
2
 20.49% LR χ 2 71.76 54.34 32.77 14.99 
 
Notes:  
1. t test scores are reported in parentheses of stage 1 regression and z test scores are reported in parentheses of 
stage 2 regressions. †, *,**, and *** indicate significance levels at 10%, 5% ,1% and 0.1%, respectively. 
2. LR χ 2 is the likelihood ratio Chi2 for Probit regressions. 
3. Please refer to Appendix 1 for the definition of variables. 
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Table 8: 2SLS Regression Results 
 
 
IOt+1 MFt+1 LTIt+1 QFIIt+1 
Constant -69.14*** -68.27*** -1.78 -0.74 
 (-3.52) (-3.82) (-0.82) (-0.82) 
CSPt 0.59* 0.49* 0.06* 0.00 
 (2.32) (2.11) (2.02) (0.40) 
MOt+1 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01† 0.00 
 (-0.72) (-0.26) (-1.68) (0.07) 
SOEt+1 -0.49 -0.32 -0.26* 0.01 
 (-0.47) (-0.34) (-2.26) (0.14) 
OLPt+1 0.87*** -0.12*** -0.01** 0.00 
 (28.36) (-4.36) (-2.61) (0.25) 
Dualityt+1 1.50 1.44 0.00 0.09 
 (1.14) (1.20) (0.03) (1.52) 
BSizet+1 0.09 -0.15 -0.17 -0.01 
 (0.07) (-0.13) (-1.22) (-0.12) 
MSizet+1 0.29 0.49 -0.12 -0.02 
 (0.24) (0.44) (-0.92) (-0.27) 
BIndept+1 -0.15* -0.13* 0.00 0.00 
 (-2.07) (-1.94) (-0.18) (-0.38) 
DSalaryt+1 0.17 0.22 0.02 -0.01 
 (0.86) (1.23) (1.06) (-1.23) 
MSalaryt+1 0.57 0.60† -0.02 0.02 
 (1.43) (1.65) (-0.37) (1.05) 
Bonust+1 -1.46 -1.45 -0.13 0.01 
 (-0.89) (-0.97) (-0.70) (0.19) 
Aget+1 0.87 0.93 -0.08 -0.05 
 (1.04) (1.22) (-0.90) (-1.19) 
ROAt+1 0.03 -0.19 0.06 0.01 
 (0.02) (-0.18) (0.49) (0.19) 
Levt+1 -3.24 -3.34† 0.10 -0.17† 
 (-1.48) (-1.67) (0.40) (-1.67) 
Sizet+1 2.80** 2.69*** 0.08 0.04 
 (3.06) (3.22) (0.80) (0.98) 
Returnt+1 0.83*** 0.71*** 0.04** 0.01 
 (5.04) (4.70) (2.14) (1.42) 
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
No. of Obs. 1430 1430 1430 1430 
Wald χ2 1282.10*** 313.48*** 106.53*** 41.30*** 
 
Notes:  
1. †, *,**, and *** indicate significance levels at 10%, 5% ,1% and 0.1%, respectively, for t and for z 
tests. 
2. Board gender diversity measured as the percentage of female directors sitting on board is used as the 
instrumental variable in 2SLS analyses. 
3. Please refer to Appendix 1 for the definition of variables. 
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Table 9: Disaggregated Voluntary CSP and Institutional Investment 
 
 
IOt+1 MFt+1 LTIt+1 QFIIt+1 
Constant -10.48*** -9.86*** -4.91*** -0.68 
 (-7.71) (-7.85) (-3.25) (-0.99) 
C1 (Environment) -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 
 (-0.34) (-0.18) (-1.04) (-0.59) 
C2 (Energy-saving) -0.27† -0.27† -0.01 0.01† 
 (-1.73) (-1.90) (-0.76) (1.78) 
C3 (Employees) 0.25 0.23 0.00 -0.01 
 (1.47) (1.46) (0.23) (-0.89) 
C4 (Equality) 0.37† 0.39† 0.01 0.01 
 (1.65) (1.85) (0.49) (0.70) 
C5 (Social) 0.33 0.34 0.05 0.01 
 (0.97) (1.10) (1.24) (0.84) 
C6 (Customers) 0.69*** 0.56*** 0.06*** 0.01 
 (4.28) (3.76) (3.36) (1.05) 
C7 (Stakeholders) -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 0.00 
 (-0.17) (-0.34) (-0.32) (1.52) 
C8 (Law-abiding and Ethics) 0.34 0.24 -0.01 -0.01 
 (1.32) (1.00) (-0.38) (-0.61) 
MOt+1 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.00 
 (0.81) (1.20) (-0.31) (0.41) 
SOEt+1 0.15 0.24 -0.21** 0.00 
 (0.16) (1.02) (-2.00) (0.01) 
OLPt+1 0.89*** -0.11*** -0.01** 0.00 
 (30.99) (-4.12) (-2.50) (0.33) 
Dualityt+1 0.71 0.78 -0.09 0.10 
 (0.60) (0.71) (-0.69) (1.61) 
BSizet+1 0.59 0.27 -0.13 -0.00 
 (0.50) (0.25) (-0.99) (-0.08) 
MSizet+1 0.61 0.70 -0.09 -0.02 
 (0.55) (0.69) (-0.70) (-0.33) 
BIndept+1 -0.14* -0.12† 0.00 0.00 
 (-2.14) (-1.93) (0.10) (-0.36) 
DSalaryt+1 0.19 0.24 0.02 -0.01 
 (1.03) (1.40) (1.18) (-1.12) 
MSalaryt+1 0.64† 0.65† -0.01 0.02 
 (1.72) (1.87) (-0.21) (1.13) 
Bonust+1 -0.65 -0.72 -0.02 0.02 
 (-0.44) (-0.53) (-0.13) (0.25) 
Aget+1 0.80 0.88 -0.09 -0.05 
 (1.02) (1.21) (-1.03) (-1.17) 
ROAt+1 -0.42 -0.59 0.02 0.01 
 (-0.38) (-0.58) (0.18) (0.22) 
Levt+1 -2.36 -0.30 -0.18 -0.17† 
 (-1.18) (-1.02) (-0.81) (-1.68) 
Sizet+1 4.53*** 4.14*** 0.26*** 0.04* 
 (11.80) (11.68) (5.99) (2.17) 
Return t+1 0.88*** 0.75*** 0.04** 0.01 
 (5.85) (5.35) (2.62) (1.44) 
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
No. of Obs. 1430 1430 1430 1430 
Adjusted R
2
 50.96% 19.28% 6.22% 0.79% 
 
Notes:  
1. t test scores are reported in parentheses. †, *,**, and *** indicate significance levels at 10%, 5% ,1% and 
0.1%, respectively.  
2. Please refer to Appendix 1 for the definition of variables.  
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Table 10: Disaggregated Voluntary CSP and Likelihood of Increases in Institutional Investment 
 
 
Prob(+ΔIOt,t+1) Prob(+ΔMFt,t+1) Prob(+ΔLTIt,t+1) Prob(+ΔQFIIt,t+1) 
Constant 0.09 -5.07 -5.19 -4.67 
 (0.11) (-0.06) (-0.04) (-0.03) 
C1 (Environment) 0.02 0.03* 0.00 0.00 
 (1.35) (2.16) (0.33) (-0.10) 
C2 (Energy-saving ) 0.00 -0.03* 0.00 0.04† 
 (-0.17) (-2.25) (0.05) (1.93) 
C3 (Employees) -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 
 (-0.78) (1.51) (-0.52) (-1.05) 
C4 (Equality) 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 
 (-0.01) (0.31) (0.84) (0.31) 
C5 (Social) -0.03 0.05 0.04 0.11** 
 (-1.26) (1.55) (1.35) (2.80) 
C6 (Customers) 0.01 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.02 
 (0.40) (4.19) (4.93) (0.97) 
C7 (Stakeholders) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (0.47) (0.76) (1.55) (1.09) 
C8 (Law-abiding and Ethics) -0.02 0.01 0.04 -0.03 
 (-0.97) (0.43) (1.32) (-0.82) 
ΔROAt,t+1 0.00 -0.05 0.03 0.17 
 (0.06) (-0.57) (0.34) (1.10) 
ΔLevt,t+1 0.01 0.06 0.09 0.12 
 (0.06) (0.40) (0.59) (0.53) 
ΔSizet,t+1 0.43*** 0.40*** 0.09 0.07 
 (3.41) (4.66) (1.31) (1.10) 
Return t,t+1 1.07*** 1.03*** 0.07 0.35 
 (6.47) (6.23) (0.30) (1.40) 
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
No. of Obs. 1430 1430 1430 1430 
LR Chi
2
 79.96 82.19 66.17 34.48 
 
Notes:  
1. t test scores are reported in parentheses. †, *,**, and *** indicate significance levels at 10%, 5% ,1% and 
0.1%, respectively. 
2. Please refer to Appendix 1 for the definition of variables. 
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Appendix 1: Definitions and Calculations of Variables 
 
Variables Definitions Calculations 
Panel A: Institutional Investment Variables  
IOt, IOt+1 Institutional investment levels in years t and t+1, respectively The shareholding 
percentage of 
institutional investors 
in each sample firm  
+IOt+1 Dummy variable  Equal to 1 if IOt+1 > 
IOt and 0 otherwise 
MFt, MFt+1 Investment levels by mutual funds in years t and t+1, respectively The shareholding 
percentage of mutual 
funds in each sample 
firm 
LTIt, LTIt+1 Investment levels by long-term institutional investors (LTI) in 
years t and t+1, respectively 
The shareholding 
percentage of 
insurance companies 
and social security 
funds in each sample 
firm 
QFIIt, QFIIt+1 Investment levels by QFIIs in years t and t+1, respectively The shareholding 
percentage of mutual 
funds in each sample 
firm 
Panel B: Voluntary CSP Variables  
CSPt Voluntary corporate social performance score  Aggregate SNAI CSR 
index (2007) 
C1  
Environment score SNAI CSR index 
(2007) with respect to 
environment  
C2  
Energy-saving score SNAI CSR index 
(2007) with respect to 
energy-saving 
C3  
Employees score SNAI CSR index 
(2007) with respect to 
employee 
C4  
Equality score SNAI CSR index 
(2007) with respect to 
equality 
C5 
Social score SNAI CSR index 
(2007) with respect to 
environment score 
C6  
Customers score SNAI CSR index 
(2007) with respect to 
customers 
C7  
Stakeholders score SNAI CSR index 
(2007) with respect to 
stakeholders 
C8 
Law-abiding and Ethics SNAI CSR index 
(2007) with respect to 
law-abiding and ethics  
Panel C: Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance Variables  
MOt 
Managerial shareholding The shareholding 
percentage of 
managers 
SOEt 
Dummy variable  Equals to 1 for SOEs 
and 0 for non-SOEs 
OLPt  
Ordinary legal persons‟ ownership The shareholding 
percentage of ordinary 
legal persons 
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Dualityt Dummy variable Equals to 1 if CEO 
and board chair are 
the same person and 0 
otherwise 
BSizet 
Board size Natural logarithm of 
the total number of 
directors on board 
MSizet 
Managerial size Natural logarithm of 
the total number of 
senior managers  
BIndept 
Board independence The percentage of 
independent directors 
on board 
Panel D: Compensation and Other Firm Characteristics Variables  
DSalaryt 
Directors‟ salaries Natural logarithm of 
the total salary of 
directors 
Msalaryt 
Managers‟ salaries Natural logarithm of 
the total salary of 
managers 
Bonust 
Bonus payments Natural logarithm of 
the total bonus 
payments of managers 
Aget 
Firm age Natural logarithm of 
the total number of 
years since the 
establishment of firms 
ROAt, ROAt+1 
Return on asset ratio Operating profits 
scaled by total assets 
in years t and t+1, 
respectively 
Levt, Levt+1 
Total debt ratio Total debts scaled by 
total assets 
Sizet, Sizet+1 
Firm size Natural logarithm of 
the total assets in 
years t and t+1, 
respectively 
Returnt, Returnt+1 
Adjusted Daily Share Return Adjusted Share 
Return on 31 
December of years t 
and t+1, respectively  
Returnt,t+1 
Adjusted Annual Share Return Adjusted Share 
Return from 31 
December of year  t to 
31 December of year  
t+1 
 
Note: BSizet, MSizet, DSalat, MSalat, Bonust, Aget, Sizet and Sizet+1 reported in Table 1 are original numbers 
before taking natural logarithms. 
 This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
Appendix 2: SNAI CSR index Criteria 
 
Criteria Sub-criteria 
C1- Environment 
 curbing polluted environment;  
 recycling waste harmful to environment;  
 producing products good to environment protection;  
 using other means to control pollution 
C2- Energy-saving 
 making use of old and waste materials;  
 making effort to reduce energy consuming;  
 continuously improving energy saving of products;  
 supporting research on energy saving 
C3- Employees 
 caring healthy and safety of employee;  
 training employee; reemployment of laid-off employees;  
 reasonably arrangement of working time and positions;  
 establishment and enforcement of standards on overtime;  
 no employment of child labour;  
 providing employee benefit 
C4- Equality 
 employment and promotion of minorities;  
 employment and promotion of female;  
 employment and promotion of the handicapped;  
 employment and promotion of veterans 
C5- Social 
 donation to community;  
 donation to education institutes;  
 donation to medical activities;  
 donation to arts and sports;  
 donation to disaster areas;  
 attention to public safety;  
 opening company facilities to the public 
C6- Customers 
 delivery on time;  
 improvement of products quality;  
 attaching importance to safe use of products;  
 bettering after service;  
 attention to interests of specific customers 
C7- Stakeholders 
 respect to interests of creditors;  
 consideration on interests of suppliers 
C8- Law-abiding / Ethics 
 anti-corruption, extortion, bribery;  
 operating faithfully and lawfully 
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i
 The fact that the voluntary CSP rating is only available for 2008 unfortunately prohibits us from analysing the 
effects of changes in the rating on institutional investment. Fortunately, this reduces the endogeneity concern in 
our study. In a scenario in which the voluntary CSP rating was available to the public in two continuous years (t 
and t+1), testing the impact of CSPt on changes in institutional investment would be complicated by the fact that 
institutional investors, as informed and sophisticated investors, would be able to predict voluntary CSPt+1.   
ii
 Institutional investment here includes investment from ordinary legal persons (normally state-owned 
enterprises) and non-financial corporations. In the present paper, ordinary legal persons and non-financial 
corporations are excluded from our definition of institutional investors. 
iii
 Extant literature offers mixed evidence of institutional investors‟ effect on firms‟ CSR/CSP. Dam and 
Scholtens (2012) suggest that shareholdings by banks and institutional investors have no significant effect on 
European firms‟ CSR. Lopatta et al. (2017) find that bank ownership is positively related to CSR performance. 
iv
 The melamine contamination incident broke out on September 11, 2008, when Sanlu Co., one of China‟s 
largest dairy manufacturers, announced that its products that were on sale, including infant formula, had been 
contaminated by melamine. Sanlu immediately recalled all its products from the market. Since melamine had 
been added to raw milk, consumers suspected that other brands‟ dairy products could potentially have been 
contaminated as well. The fear was confirmed two days later when products of 22 brands (with total market 
shares exceeding 90% in liquid milk and 50% in powdered milk) were found to contain melamine.  
v
 We extend the work of Wang et al. (2011) by several means. First, we conduct analyses on a larger sample of 
listed firms (over 1,400 in comparison to 114). This ensures the generality of our empirical evidence. Second, 
the event study methodology in Wang et al. (2011) captures the response of mutual funds to the melamine 
contamination incident but does not necessary lead to the implication that mutual funds trade according to the 
more general and regular CSR disclosure in China. Third, we consider other types of institutional investors in 
China, in addition to the mutual funds investigated in Wang et al. (2011), as will be discussed later in this 
section. 
vi
 Bushee (2001) and Yan and Zhang (2009) classify institutional investors according to their portfolio turnovers. 
Unfortunately, portfolio turnover data are not available for our sample firms. 
vii
 Securities companies function as investment banks and asset management companies in China. 
viii
 The voice approach commonly means voting against the management, where institutional investors monitor 
firm management. The exit approach is also called „voting with one‟s feet‟ and refers to institutional investors 
choosing to liquidate their shareholdings in a firm. 
ix
 In January 2014, the CIRC started consulting with the public regarding its intention to lift the 25% cap to 30%, 
implying that the government was making an effort to encourage equity investment by long-term institutional 
investors such as insurance companies.     
x
 On August 1, 2000, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council decided to 
establish the national social security fund as a solution to its aging population problem. 
xi
 Ordinary legal persons are usually SOE owners. 
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